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Mackey: Administrative Law - Preinduction Judicial Review of Reclassifica

CASE NOTE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Preinduction Judicial Review of Reclassification for
Delinquency by Selective Service System Local Board. Oestereich
v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11, 89 S. Ct. 414
(1968).

James J. Oestereich was enrolled as a student at a theological school preparing for the ministry and was classified
IV-D by the Selective Service Board under section 6(g) of
the Selective Service Act.1 He returned his certificate of
registration to the government as an act of dissent to United
States' participation in the war in Vietnam. His board
declared him delinquent for failure to have his certificate of
registration in his possession under Section 1617.1 of Selective
Service System regulations and for failure to notify the board
of his local status. The board reclassified him I-A. Oestereicb
took an administrative appeal, lost and was then ordered to
report for induction. He then brought suit to restrain his
induction. The government challenged the suit under Section
10(b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,2 which
provides that there shall be no preinduction judicial review
of the classification or processing of any registrant under
the act. Held: A selective Service registrant who was exempt
under 6(g) of the Selective Service Act could not be deprived
of that statutory exemption through the use of Selective
Service regulations governing delinquency, where the registrant was reclassified I-A after he turned in his certificate
of registration to the government.
In an earlier act3 Congress chose to remain silent on the
questiontion of judicial review and the question was raised
by Falbo v. United States.' In that case the petitioner was
classified as a contientious objector over his protest that he
should have the ministerial exemption. The petitioner sought
judicial review of that classification, contending that such
review was a constitutional requirement. In holding that congress was not required to provide for judicial review prior
to final acceptance of the registrant for national service the
Supreme Court set a pattern which has seldom been altered.
Judicial review of classification of a registrant under the
1. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 456(g) (1964).
2. 0 U.S.C. APP. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. III 1967).
3. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
4. 820 U.S. 549 (1944).
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Selective Service Acts can only come as a defense to a criminal
prosecution.
In 1946, the Supreme Court distinguished Falbo in Estep
v. United States.' Here again it was the ministerial exemption
(so important to the holding in Oestereieh) which brought
forth the issue of judicial review. In Estep, the petitioner, a
Jehovah's Witness, claimed the ministerial exemption but
was classified I-A (available for military service) by his local
board. The petitioner raised the act of classification by the
board as a defense to criminal prosecution for failure to carry
out a duty required by the act.' In stating that Falbo did not
preclude the judicial review of the classification, the Court
stated in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas "[w]e cannot
read section -- [50 U.S.C. sect. 311] as requiring the courts
to inflict punishment on registrants for violating whatever
orders the local boards might issue. We cannot believe that
Congress intended that criminal sanctions were to be applied
to orders issued by local boards no matter how flagrantly
they violated the rules and regulations which define their
jurisdiction."' The opinion goes on to find that the local
board did in fact go beyond their jurisdiction stating that
"[t]he question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached
only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it
It was clear that the power of the
gave the registrant.'
local board was not to be taken lightly since relief in a court
of law would be difficult to come by.
Estep also presents another ray of hope for the registrant
who feels that he was wronged by his local board. Should the
possibility of losing a criminal prosecution and suffering the
consequences of a felony conviction be too much for the less
determined, the alternative is habeas corpus proceedings after
submission to induction.' The court "assumed" that habeas
corpus was available only after induction into the armed
services.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

327 U.S. 114 (1946).
54 Stat. 893 (1940).
327 U.S. 114, 121 (1946).
Id. at 122-23.
Estep v. United States, supra, note 7 at 124.
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The habeas corpus issue was raised in Eagles, Post Commanding Officer v. United States xe rel. Samuels"0 where the
registrant claimed a ministerial exemption (IV-D under the
1940 act) but was classified I-A and ordered to report and
did in fact report for military service. In discussing the
challenge of classification by the local board Mr. Justice
Douglas pointed out the use of habeas corpus as a method
to this end. "The function of habeas corpus is not to correct
a practice but only to ascertain whether the procedure complained of [classification by local board] has resulted in an
unlawful detention."" Regardless of the possibilities of abuse,
the petitioner must show that the particular proceeding must
be so corrupt as to be unfair.
Prior to the principal case, then, there were two methods
of obtaining judicial review of the classification by a local
board. First, judicial review would be allowed where there
was no basis in fact for the classification assigned; and second, habeas corpus after induction. It is the purpose of this
note to determine the effect of the Oestereich holding on the
judicial review question.
The facts of the case do not shock the senses and are not
particularly new. In both Falbo2 and Estep'3 the ministerial
exemption was in question. The important fact here is the
method employed by the board to reclassify the registrant. A
rather unique method of delinquency classification was employed to deprive the registrant of his obvious statutory
exemption. In returning his draft card to the government the
registrant had become delinquent. The use of this method
of reclassification was advocated in the now famous Hershey
memorandum.' It was apparently this power that the case
sought to examine. In discussing the use of delinquency for
reclassification the court per Justice Douglas stated that to
follow the power inherent in such an approach is to "make
the Boards free-wheeling agencies meting out their brand of
The opinion then goes on
justice in a vindictive manner."
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

329 U.S. 304 (1946).
Id. at 315.
820 U.S. 549 (1944).
327 U.S. 114 (1946).
32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1969).
S. Doc. No. 82, 89th Cong., 2d Ses. p. 4 (1966).
89 S. Ct. 414, 416 (1968).
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to explain that a draft exemption granted by congress can
not be removed by the action of the local board, giving notice
that the discretion of the board is not greater than the discretion of congress. Unfortunately few draft exemptions are as
clear on their face as the ministerial exemption 7 and therefore, the discretionary factor is not nearly as clear in other
areas as we find in Oestereich.
Another concept raised by the line of cases discussed here
is that before one can challenge the actions of a local board,
he must first submit to a criminal prosecution for failure to
comply with an induction order. The cases supporting this
position are so numerous that citation here would be futile.
However, a few excerpts might clarify the position taken by
8 Judge
the courts on the matter. In Fostor v. United States"
Ainsworth stated "Congress chose not to give administrative
action under the Act the customary scope of judicial review;"" Wiggins v. United States" states " [i] n the Universal
Military Training and Service Act Congress limited the
scope of judicial review more severely than Congress usually
limits review of administrative action:'' and finally and
more clearly it has been stated that the range of judicial
review under the Selective Service laws is "the narrowest
22
known to the law."
Oestereich seems to lend support to the position already
made clear that the courts will not act as a "super board"
in reviewing draft classification in spite of the judicial
slapping of the hands of the local boards.
A look at the subsequent treatment of the Oestereich
decision seems to give little assistance to one seeking an escape
of the draft through analogies drawn from Oestereich. The
most likely analogy would appear to be a II-S or student
deferment classification which on its face limits somewhat
the discretion of the board as to qualifications for the deferment.2" When the case arose, however, the analogy failed.2 4
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See for example: 5 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) or (2) (1964).
384 F.2d 372 (5th Cir- 1967).
Id. at 373.
261 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 114.
Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388, 396 (9th Cir- 1966).
50 U.S.C. Apr. § 456(h) (1) (1964).
Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 37 U.S.L.W. 2433 (2d Cir. Jan.
10, 1969).
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Under circumstances similar to those in Oestereich, the regis-

trant was reclassified as a delinquent from II-S to I-A. The
Second Circuit reversed its position taken prior to Oestereich
in Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16,25 which
followed the analogy pointed out above in allowing preinduction judicial review for reclassification from II-S to I-A.
In doing so, however, the court per Judge Friendly relies
upon the following language:
We consequently find no sufficient justification in
this case for denying to the words of the 1967 amendment to § 10 (b) (3) the meaning which they so plainly
have and which the committee reports, set forth in the
dissenting opinion in Oestereich show they were intended to have. As recognized by Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Oestereich ...Section [10(b)

(3)] was likely precipitated by the Second Circuit's
well publicized decision in Wolff.
If Congress meant to withhold the preinduction review we had granted in Wolff to students enjoying
deferments who had been declared delinquent for
acts not within the regulations, it surely must have
intended to do this where, as here, there has been
an undisputed violation of [the regulations] requiring continued possession of a certificate."
By doing this, the Second Circuit seems to rely on the
reasoning of the concurring and dissenting opinions to substantiate a position which fails to recognize the reasoning of
the majority, i.e. where Congress has granted an exemption
(or deferment as the case may be) the local board may not
go beyond its discretionary functions in determining the facts
through the use of delinquency classifications.
Another recent case 7 lends support to the analogy without having to decide the issue. In this case a graduate student
deferment subject specifically to discretion of the local board"
was in question but in discussing the problem of undergraduate deferments, Judge Mathes states in his opinion "if
25. 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. Breen v. Selective Serv. Local Rd. No. 16, supra note 24.
27. Kolden v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 4, 36 U.S.L.W. 2434 (8th Cir. Jan.
28, 1969).
28. 5 U.S.C. APP. § 456(h) (1) (1964).
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appellant here had been an undergraduate student duly possessing a II-S classification who had been reclassified I-A
for reasons other than ceasing to be a full-time student in
good standing, the case would be more closely analogous to
Oestereich's situation." 9
With only these two opinions available and one of them
covering the subject only by the way of dictum, it is difficult
to say that Oestereich carries with it any real force in situanions other than the statutory ministerial and divinity student
exemption, but it can be said that if one were expecing great
things to arise from this recent attack on the Selective Service
System, he must be disappointed thus far.
No new law was made; only a reaffirmation of the courts
hesitancy to delve into the mysterious workings of the Selective Service System local boards can be seen. The law has
apparently escaped the attack unscathed.
TERRENCE MACKEY

29. Kolden v. Selective Serv. Local Ed. No. 4, supra note 27.
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